Category: Security


AVG scored in the top 5 again.  This is the reason i’ve partnered with AVG as recently their products have garnered consistent top 5 scores while costing much less and while being much less invasive than other products.  AVG has come quite a way since their arrival a while back.  I’m hoping they will continue to be as lightweight as they have been in the past.

 

AVG’s scores are here.

Norton’s scores are here

Trend Micro’s scores are here

McAfee’s scores are here.

 

AV-TEST – The Independent IT-Security Institute: Test Reports.

HOW TO FIND OUT IF YOU HAVE BEEN ROOTED:

ls -la /lib64/libkeyutils.so.1.9

rpm -qf /lib64/libkeyutils.so.1.9

ls -la /lib/libkeyutils.so.1.9

rpm -qf /lib/libkeyutils.so.1.9

If you find the file and RPM shows “is not owned by any package” you have been rooted.

Currently known affected OSes:  RHEL-based servers

Currently known effected control panels:  cPanel, DirectAdmin, and Plesk

we do not know if controls panels are the reason or not.

Servers with ksplice have been exploited

via 0day Linux/CentOS SSHd Spam Exploit — libkeyutils.so.1.9 | Security, Server Tweaking, IT Management Blog By SolidShellSecurity.

As the world’s various media outlets start talking breathlessly about how dangerous UPNP is anyone who has talked to me(every one of my clients knows about this) I’ve always maintained UPNP was a huge security hole.  I’ve seen Microsoft among others talk about how it’s not a security threat to allow something inside your network to automatically open holes into your firewall without the network admin’s knowledge.  me and others(like Stever Gibson0 have been vindicated once again.  UPNP has ALWAYS been a a hackers dream…it just took someone a while to prove to the rest of the world what the security guys have been saying base on common sense for years now.  Everyone NEEDS to test their routers now.  You can do it here.  if you fail the test please contact ECC immediately.  Sophos  explains the danger in this blog post.

Tens of millions of network-enabled devices including routers, printers, media servers, IP cameras, smart TVs and more can be attacked over the Internet because of dangerous flaws in their implementation of the UPnP Universal Plug and Play protocol standard, security researchers from Rapid7 said Tuesday in a research paper.UPnP allows networked devices to discover each other and automatically establish working configurations that enable data sharing, media streaming, media playback control and other services. In one common scenario a file-sharing application running on a computer can tell a router via UPnP to open a specific port and map it to the computer’s local network address in order to open its file-sharing service to Internet users.UPnP is intended to be used primarily inside local networks. However, security researchers from Rapid7 found over 80 million unique public IP Internet Protocol addresses that responded to UPnP discovery requests over the Internet, during scans performed last year from June to November.

via Researcher: UPnP flaws expose millions of networked devices to remote attacks | PCWorld.

How lovely.  It is one thing to leave backdoors but to make them so insecure is inexcusable.  If you value security yank these devices and start hammering barracuda to fix their vulnerabilities.

 

A variety of the latest firewall, spam filter and VPN appliances sold by Campbell, Calif. based Barracuda Networks Inc. contain undocumented backdoor accounts, the company disclosed today. Worse still, while the backdoor accounts are apparently set up so that they would only be accessible from Internet addresses assigned to Barracuda, they are in fact accessible to potentially hundreds of other companies and network owners.

Barracuda’s hardware devices are broadly deployed in corporate environments, including the Barracuda Web Filter, Message Archiver, Web Application Firewall, Link Balancer, and SSL VPN. Stefan Viehböck, a security researcher at Vienna, Austria-based SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab., discovered in November 2012 that these devices all included undocumented operating system accounts that could be used to access the appliances remotely over the Internet via secure shell (SSH).

Viehböck found that the username “product” could be used to login and gain access to the device’s MySQL database (root@localhost) with no password, which he said would allow an attacker to add new users with administrative privileges to the appliances. SEC Consult found a password file containing a number of other accounts and hashed passwords, some of which were uncomplicated and could be cracked with little effort.

Viehböck said he soon found that these devices all were configured out-of-the-box to listen for incoming SSH connections on those undocumented accounts, but that the devices were set to accept connection attempts only from Internet address ranges occupied by Barracuda Networks. Unfortunately, Barracuda is not the only occupant of these ranges. Indeed, a cursory lookup of the address ranges at network mapping site Robtex.com shows there are potentially hundreds of other companies running Web sites and other online operations in the same space.

via Backdoors Found in Barracuda Networks Gear — Krebs on Security.

I’m going to watch this to see if it is really something to be concerned about or not.  However the e-mail re-infection component has me a bit concerned.  If that’s the case anyone who thinks ANY machine with malware can be cleaned is foolish.  I may have to re-evaluate my malware handling procedures.

 

Researchers have uncovered an ongoing, large-scale computer espionage network that’s targeting hundreds of diplomatic, governmental, and scientific organizations in at least 39 countries, including the Russian Federation, Iran, and the United States.

Operation Red October, as researchers from antivirus provider Kaspersky Lab have dubbed the highly coordinated campaign, has been active since 2007, raising the possibility it has already siphoned up hundreds of terabytes of sensitive information. It uses more than 1,000 distinct modules that have never been seen before to customize attack profiles for each victim. Among other things, components target individual PCs, networking equipment from Cisco Systems, and smartphones from Apple, Microsoft, and Nokia. The attack also features a network of command-and-control servers with a complexity that rivals that used by the Flame espionage malware that targeted Iran.

“This is a pretty glaring example of a multiyear cyber espionage campaign,” Kaspersky Lab expert Kurt Baumgartner told Ars. “We haven’t seen these sorts of modules being distributed, so the customized approach to attacking individual victims is something we haven’t seen before at this level.”

The main purpose of the campaign is to gather classified information and geopolitical intelligence. Among the data collected are files from cryptographic systems such as the Acid Cryptofiler, with the collected information used in later attacks. Stolen credentials, for instance, were compiled and used later when the attackers needed to guess secret phrases in other locations.

Little is known about the people or organizations responsible for the project, and conflicting data makes it hard to attribute the nationality of the attackers. While the malware developers spoke Russian, many of the exploits used to hijack victim computers were initially developed by Chinese hackers. Also clouding the identity of the attackers is the long roster of victims. The Russian Federation was the most targeted country, followed by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belgium, India, Afghanistan, Armenia, Iran, and Turkmenistan. In all computers belonging to 39 countries from a variety of continents are infected.

The command-and-control infrastructure that receives the stolen data uses more than 60 domain names as proxy servers to obscure the final destination. These domains are believed to funnel data to a second tier of proxy servers, which in turn are believed to send the information to a “mother ship” that Kaspersky researchers still know little about. The ability of the infrastructure to shield the identity of the attackers and to resist takedown efforts rivals the command-and-control system used by Flame, the espionage malware reportedly developed by the US and Israel to spy on Iran. The Red October malware itself has remained undetected on more than 300 PCs and networks for more than five years.

“It’s been a very-well-maintained and set-up infrastructure that’s supported with multiple levels of proxies in order to hide away the mothership,” Baumgartner said. “They’ve been very effective at cycling through these domains and staying under the radar for the past five years.”

“Foolproof” backdoor

One novel feature contained in Red October is a module that creates an extension for Adobe Reader and Microsoft Word on compromised machines. Once installed, the module provides attackers with a “foolproof” way to regain control of a compromised machine, should the main malware payload ever be removed.

“The document may be sent to the victim via e-mail,” the researchers explained. “It will not have an exploit code and will safely pass all security checks. However, like with exploit case, the document will be instantly processed by the module and the module will start a malicious application attached to the document.”

Red October is also notable for the broad array of devices it targets. Beside PCs and computer workstations, it’s capable of stealing data from iPhones and Nokia and Windows Mobile smartphones, along with Cisco enterprise network equipment. It can also retrieve data from removable disk drives, including files that have already been deleted, thanks to a custom file recovery procedure.

via Massive espionage malware targeting governments undetected for 5 years | Ars Technica.

This has been a long standing procedure.  If you are online and what to have an online identity certificate that identifies you you have been required to go to various third parties(Verisign, GoDaddy just to name two) and pay them to issue you a digital certificate that other folks then accept as being genuinely unique to you.  The problem is…now you have placed the security and authenticity of your online identity in the hands of a third party.  What happens when, not if,  that third party gets hacked?  Your online identity has been compromised and now these digital certificates aren’t worth much now are they?  This philosophy is very counter-intuitive due to the fact in banking we tell clients…you must be careful to not allow your identity to be stolen and we rail against allowing third parties access to your information.  yes for online security we are doing just that?  One of the basics is to NOT trust third parties with your information.  We spent enormous amounts of time and money trying to prevent this very thing as much as possible.  Why are we then spending the same amount of time and money doing just to opposite to verify we are who we say we are when we are talking about the Internet?  If you just look at these two side by side..one is best practices and one is backwards.  If we are going to tell folks self protection and generation is the way to go why do the opposite online?  The RSA company was compromised and now two factor authentication tokens are now all worthless until the RSA generates a new algorithm   Comodo just was compromised by a third party of theirs that then compromised their own certificate database for some very high profile sites.  If you have not updated your browsers(yes all of them) you could now be receiving bad certificates that say they are genuine but aren’t.  Frankly this makes no sense to me.  All a third party has to do is screw up once..and ALL of their clients can be affected.  You then have to do something like update all of your software or redo all of your dongles once that occurs.  I use only self-generated certificates.  That way I know they are genuine and aren’t compromised.  If i get compromised It’s only me.   I don’t see how this reliance on third party for online security is progress.

 

Brian krebs tweet: as w/ this Comodo cert issue and the RSA mess, I’m struck by how many big security threats r beyond user’s ability to do squat about them

comodo incident listing http://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html

ms advisory on issue http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/2524375.mspx

Steve Gibson on RSA hack http://steve.grc.com/2011/03/19/reverse-engineering-rsas-statement/ follow embedded links too.

Folks…a firewall isn’t enough.  You should not even leave the ports open for these devices.  the only way to have a remote chance of doing this safely is to use a vpn so your connection is encrypted then you can get it. Honestly for these systems that are deemed critical it is simply foolish to have it on the internet at all…it will get taken over even with firewalls and vpn’s in place.  Unless folks really want to use proper security(which most don’t) these incidents are not only going to continue but will grow in size and damage potential..or damage actually caused.  Small businesses are also very lax in their security postures these days.  many of the compromises could be avoided with some simple behavioral changes…technology can’t solve the issue if the issue is the loack of good security habits by their human operators or caretakers.

 

Hackers illegally accessed the Internet-connected controls of a New Jersey-based company’s internal heating and air-conditioning system by exploiting a backdoor in a widely used piece of software, according to a recently published memo issued by the FBI.

The backdoor was contained in older versions of the Niagara AX Framework, which is used to remotely control boiler, heating, fire detection, and surveillance systems for the Pentagon, the FBI, the US Attorney’s Office, and the Internal Revenue Service, among many others. The exploit gave hackers using multiple unauthorized US and international IP addresses access to a “Graphical User Interface (GUI), which provided a floor plan layout of the office, with control fields and feedback for each office and shop area,” according to the memo, which was issued in July. “All areas of the office were clearly labeled with employee names or area names.”

An IT contractor for the unnamed business told FBI agents the “Niagara control box was directly connected to the Internet with no interposing firewall,” according to the memo, which was published Saturday by Public Intelligence. The website has an established track record of posting authentic government documents. Barbara Woodruff, a spokeswoman in the Newark, New Jersey division of the FBI, where the memo originated, said the document appeared to be authentic.

The unauthorized access began in February, a few weeks after someone using the Twitter handle @ntisec posted comments indicating hackers were targeting SCADA—or supervisory control and data acquisition—systems. One tweet included a list of Internet addresses, including one that was assigned to the heating system belonging to the New Jersey business. The hack came five months before security researchers Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle blew the whistle on serious vulnerabilities in the Niagara system, which is marketed by Tridium, a company with US offices located in Richmond, Virginia.

Only getting worse

The revelation that Niagara vulnerabilities have been actively exploited in the wild is significant because the system is widely used to control critical equipment used around the world. Further, the number of Internet-facing Niagara systems appears to be growing. A search using the Shodan computer search engine late last year found about 16,000 systems, with more than 12,000 of those based in the US, according to Billy Rios, one of the security researchers who documented the vulnerabilities in the industrial control system. This year, the same search returned more than 20,000 systems, with about 16,000 of them in the US. While patches released earlier this year apply only to versions 3.5 and 3.6 of Niagara, Shodan continues to show “tons” of systems running earlier versions, including 1.1, Rios said.

“These things keep popping up,” he told Ars. “It’s not going away. It’s getting worse.”

Perhaps the only other documented case of an industrial control system being breached in the US came in 2009, when a security guard abused his physical access to breach computers that controlled air-conditioning systems at a Texas hospital. The intrusion came to light after he posted a screenshots and other evidence showing he had control of the systems that cool operating rooms and other critical areas of the Texas facility, where temperatures regularly hit the triple digits. He has spent most of his time since in federal prison.

via Intruders hack industrial heating system using backdoor posted online | Ars Technica.

Many folks cringe at IT having tight control…but then when users in organizations start tossing things into the cloud they then expect IT to bail them out.  That’s an impossible place and I’ve seen more and more It folks going,” you threw it up there without consulting us..it’s your baby now”.  the results are usually disastrous and things get put back form the cloud once that inevitable disaster begins.  the cloud can be leveraged in a good way but i wouldn’t put anything critical or private into it.  The cloud is ripe for a major data harvesting attack to explode…I’m sure it has already occurred..we just don’t know about it yet.

 

In many cases, IT organizations are not fully aware of which cloud applications are in use across the enterprise, which makes it more difficult than ever for enterprises to monitor and control user access to mission-critical applications and data. In fact, only 34% of companies bring IT staff into the vendor selection and planning process when a cloud application is procured without using IT’s budget, making it very difficult to proactively address security and compliance requirements for those applications.

SailPoint’s survey found that business users have gained more autonomy to deploy cloud applications without IT involvement, yet they do not feel responsible for managing access control. In fact, 70% of business leaders believe that IT is ultimately responsible for managing user access to cloud applications. Adding to IT’s challenge, more than 14% of business leaders admit they have no way of knowing if sensitive data is stored in the cloud at all. This lack of visibility and control greatly increases an organizations risk of security breaches, exposure to insider threats and failed audits.

“As organizations adopt cloud applications, they are very likely to increase their risk exposure by putting sensitive data in the cloud without adequate controls or security processes in place,” said Jackie Gilbert, VP and GM of SailPoint’s Cloud Business Unit. “And this year’s survey illustrates how ‘at risk’ companies already are. Many companies lack visibility not only to what data is in the cloud, but also to who can access that data. It’s imperative that companies put in place the right monitoring and controls to mitigate these growing risks.”

via Increasing cloud adoption puts enterprises at risk.

To get rid of System Progressive Protection, you should use updated anti-malware programs, such as  Spyware Doctor or SpyHunter. They will kill all malware processes and will remove infected files from the system. You may find it difficult to launch these programs, so reboot to safe mode or use invented email and this code for a ‘registration’ of this scamware: AA39754E-715219CE. This code will make your malware think that you have purchased its license and will disable it. Of course, it won’t remove infected files from your computer, so you should run a full system scan immediately after that.

via Remove System Progressive Protection, removal instructions.

Small Businesses are increasingly the targets of more and more sophisticated malware and fraud attempts due to the fact most of them have the attitude, “i’m too small for them to care”.  However since they are the least secure and the easiest to take down they are the ones getting hit.  i do not want to see another SMB get nailed and I am doing all i can to dispel this dangerous mythical attitude.  From subway store wifi takeovers(in which the pos machines are then compromised) to malware installs on company computers to enable bank fraud(of which most is NOT covered under Federal anti-fraud rules so the loss is borne by the business) the time for SMB’s to become much more aware of their own vulnerability is right now.  It’s time to wake and realize the “small guys” are the primary targets now.  The big news folks will only report of big compromises..but most fraud is actually against the little folks…that’s where the real money is.  This isn’t fear…this is fact.  read further on the linked site about more SMB’s getting defrauded..it will hopefully open your eyes.

 

The Scrap Value of a Hacked PC, Revisited — Krebs on Security.